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COREWARDBook 4-Week Pilot

COREWARD Twin: verifiable behaviour for connected machines.

A signed build proves where software came from. It does not prove that running software behaves the way its authors intended.

COREWARD Twin binds signed builds to an executable state-machine digital twin, and verifies field telemetry against it continuously. You start without changing control logic.

Built on open standards

  • Sigstore
  • in-toto
  • SLSA v1
  • CycloneDX
  • IETF COSE (RFC 9052)
  • EAT (RFC 9711)
  • RATS (RFC 9334)
  • MQTT 5
  • Kafka
  • xmachines

Provenance stops at the artifact.

Intent is not recorded.

A software bill of materials (SBOM) lists what went into the binary. Nothing signed defines what the machine is allowed to do.

Runtime is not observed.

Verification happens once, at install. Unauthorized floor tuning, client script edits, misconfigurations and tampering go undetected in the field.

Evidence is not attributable.

Mutable text logs cannot tie a field incident to a specific signed build digest when it matters: Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) Art. 14 reporting, which applies from 11 September 2026; substantial modification under the Machinery Regulation, Art. 18, from 20 January 2027; and UNECE R155/R156 for vehicles.

Replay a signed trace.

Pick a machine and a scenario. Each event gets a verdict: allowed, not allowed, or missing. The checks run in your browser, on real signatures and hashes.

Loading trace

Scenario
device
…
build_digest
…
twin_digest
…
runtime
…
Signed events on the wire

    Verdict stream

    waiting
    1. Choose a machine and a scenario, then step the twin.
    The same check from the command line (planned, not yet released; illustrative output)
    # In CI: sign the build and attest its twin
    coreward sign app.bin --twin twin.json --sbom app.cdx.json --provenance slsa.json
    
    # On the server: replay a device's signed events through the attested twin
    coreward replay --device press-line-plc-12 --from kafka://events --twin sha256:c42afc8f…
    #1 Conforms  #2 Conforms  #3 Illegal transition  #4 Conforms
    Run this on your machine data

    One chain of trust, two layers.

    The build layer proves where software came from. The twin layer checks what it does in the field.

    1. 01

      CI build

      Keyless signing through Sigstore (Fulcio and Rekor) in GitLab CI, GitHub Actions or self-hosted pipelines, with SLSA provenance, a CycloneDX SBOM and a twin attestation.

    2. 02

      Device edge

      A secure element (TPM 2.0, Arm PSA or a discrete chip) signs events or snapshots as COSE_Sign1, with a monotonic counter and a hash chain. Optional COSE_Encrypt0 keeps payloads confidential.

    3. 03

      Stream ingestion

      MQTT 5 over mutual TLS bridges into Kafka (Redpanda Connect), keeping an ordered, replayable log per device ID.

    4. 04

      Reference twin

      The server runs the attested xmachines definition, verifies signatures and ordering, steps the machine, and writes a verdict tied to the exact build digest.

    How each link is checked

    Deployment modes.

    Mode 01
    Model mode Deploy now
    Mode 02
    Same-machine mode Target
    The device runsIts existing firmware, emitting eventsThe signed state chart itself, on xmachines-rs
    The twin isA model of the transitions the firmware may takeThe identical signed definition
    A match meansEvery event is a legal transition from the current stateExact equality of state, context and emitted events
    Changes on the deviceNone to control logic. Events are signed at a gateway or secure element.Firmware moves onto the deterministic xmachines-rs runtime
    Hardware anchorSecure element or gateway keyCOREWARD hardware anchor (secure element)
    CatchesIllegal transitions, gaps, forged or altered eventsAll of that, plus any divergence: tampering or a runtime defect

    Open standard or enterprise vault.

    COREWARD Twin
    Open standard
    COREWARD Vault Planned
    Enterprise SaaS or BYOC
    Signing rootPublic Sigstore (Fulcio, Rekor)Private hosted Sigstore with your own TUF root
    Transparency logPublic: identities and digests are visibleInternal: visible to your own auditors
    Payloads on the brokerSigned (COSE_Sign1)Signed and encrypted (COSE_Encrypt0): brokers carry ciphertext only
    Evidence retentionYour own Kafka retention10-year immutable WORM archive
    Incident reportingVerdict topic in KafkaEvidence packets for CRA Art. 14 notifications (24-hour early warning)
    DeploymentOpen standard, self-hostedEnterprise SaaS or bring your own cloud (BYOC)

    A 4-week shadow pilot.

    1. Step 1IntakeOne platform or hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) bench.
    2. Step 2Sign and mapWeeks 1 to 2: sign the build, write the twin, map telemetry to events.
    3. Step 3Shadow replay and verdict reportWeeks 3 to 4: replay real field data and deliver the verdict report.

    Fixed-scope pilot fee, 100% credited toward Year 1 production licensing. Flat CI tier plus per-asset fleet pricing, with no per-message fees.

    Book a 4-week shadow pilot

    hello@coreward.dev · Stockholm